



IMPROVING THE PATENT SYSTEM BY ENCOURAGING 
INTENTIONAL INFRINGEMENT: THE BENEFICIAL 
USE STANDARD OF PATENTS 
KAI YI XIE† 
With the growing importance of intellectual property in the global economy, 
“patent infringement” has become a dirty phrase for patentees and defendants alike. 
For plaintiffs, it raises thoughts of the theft of one’s just deserts. Yet defendants may 
think of nuisance-value suits and artificial impediments to the free flow of information. 
Neither side is happy because the American patent system adopts a blunderbuss approach 
to granting and protecting inventions. We have a one-size-fits-all solution regulated 
by an administrative agency, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, incapable 
(perhaps intentionally) of reliably screening out low-quality patent applications. The 
result has been a deluge of patents that have been granted when they should not have 
been—i.e., patents that remain unlitigated, impose high costs, and chill follow-on 
innovation. But because all patents are treated alike, good patents and bad patents 
are equal under the law; the patent right is always of equal “strength.” 
In this Comment, I argue that patent infringement is something to be embraced, 
not avoided. Much as the legal academy and practitioners have adopted the 
counterintuitive idea of the efficient breach of contracts, I note that there is such a 
thing as the efficient infringement of patents; we should be encouraging infringement in 
certain circumstances to address to the vast private and social costs in today’s patenting 
system. In this Comment, I analyze the economic and philosophical underpinnings of 
patent rights, and also make comparisons to trademark law and water law—another 
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area of law that assigns rights under conditions of scarcity. Through this analysis, I 
demonstrate that sometimes incentivizing patent infringement by varying the strength 
of the patent right is preferable to the status quo. There is no reason for us to have a 
one-size-fits-all patent right when granted patents are often of low quality and there 
is room to fit the strength of the right to the underlying value of the patent. 
Simply put, I show that a “beneficial use” standard for patents, one that 
identifies whether the patent owner is exploiting the granted patent right in a 
societally beneficial manner, is more efficient and makes for better policy than our 
current system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Calls for patent reform have reverberated loudly from Silicon Valley to 
the halls of Congress, making for unlikely bedfellows like Adobe and 
JCPenney in the battle against nonpracticing entities (NPEs), or so-called 
patent trolls.1 Although post–America Invents Act (AIA) Congresses have 
proposed myriad bills seeking to address the purported inefficiencies of the 
patent system, none have reached the President’s pen.2 Far from solving an 
obvious problem, patent reform has faced roadblocks because there is little 
 
1 Brian Fung, Patent Reform Advocates Are Launching a ‘Super-Coalition’ to Whack Patent Trolls, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/15/patent-reform-
advocates-are-launching-a-super-coalition-to-whack-patent-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/46NU-BDDA].  
2 Pauline Pelletier & Eric Steffe, What to Know About Patent Reform Bills Heading Into 2016, 
LAW360 (Dec. 23, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/740947/what-to-know-about-
patent-reform-bills-heading-into-2016 [https://perma.cc/KE87-78DB]; see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 
281 (2015) (stating that none of the patent reform bills proposed in the 113th Congress became law). 
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consensus regarding what the exact problem is and which policy levers 
Congress should pull to fix the issue du jour. For instance, empirical data 
present a far from convincing picture of the negative impacts of NPE 
activity.3 Nor is it obvious that we should simply make issued patents better by 
throwing money at the Patent Office to make it a more effective screening 
mechanism, rooting out “bad” patents before they can even become patents.4 
Despite all of what we do not know, there are some critical and near-universal 
opinions about the patent system that suggest we should attempt to fix it 
rather than give up in the face of uncertainty: an incredible number of patents are 
low-quality (i.e., were granted and should not have been)5 and remain unlitigated.6 
Even if we are to assume that worthless patents are cost-neutral to society 
and there are no externalities, these patents have already imposed administrative 
costs on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and private costs on 
the patentee. At best, spending capital on droves of frivolous patents indicates 
at least partial market failure due to cost-internalization issues on the part of 
the patentee. At worst, poor quality creates inherent uncertainty in patents, 
driving up private and social costs.7 In addition, unlitigated or low-quality 
patents can still exert a strong chilling effect on follow-on innovation, 
especially in a portfolio of related patents (a so-called patent thicket).8 It is 
difficult to quantify such effects. After all, how does one quantify the mere 
potentiality for more innovation had it not been for a blocking patent or 
portfolio? Thus, it makes it difficult to legislate a solution because it is nearly 
impossible to measure innovation that does not exist but could have existed 
had it not been for a predicate condition. So how would Congress, using 
command-and-control policy levers, ever be able to legislate an optimal solution 
given that the requisite cost–benefit analysis is shrouded in uncertainty? 
 
3 See, e.g., Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 497-98 (2012) (suggesting 
that “NPEs appear to be an important outlet for the enforcement of inventor-owned patents”). 
4 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1508-11 
(2001) (arguing that improving the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office process to screen out more 
bad patents would incur greater costs than simply dealing with problematic patents when they are 
later litigated). 
5 See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2172 
(2009) (discussing the “widespread agreement” that there is a problem with poor patent quality). 
6 See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1521-22 (2005) 
(noting that the USPTO grants approximately 180,000 patents each year, but patent holders file 
only 3000 lawsuits annually—involving a mere 4500 patents). The difference between the total 
number of patents and those patents that are litigated is more striking when considering the fact 
that a patent can be litigated at any point during the patent term (which is currently twenty years from 
filing), not merely in the year it was granted. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). And over its twenty-year 
term, the same patent can also be repeatedly litigated against multiple parties. 
7 Wagner, supra note 5, at 2140-43. 
8 For more information on patent thickets, see generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk 
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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Instead of ham-handedly passing laws in an attempt to address the 
symptoms of an inefficient patent system, a better approach would be to offer 
incentives to patentees to encourage societally beneficial patenting behaviors 
and punish them for detrimental behaviors.9 In this Comment, I argue that 
we can do so by varying the strength of the patent right as a function of the 
patent owner’s post-grant behavior. Under such an approach, “good” behaviors 
would be rewarded with a stronger patent right. Undesirable behaviors, such 
as letting the patent lay unexploited and unused, would be punished with a 
weaker patent right. And, as I will explain, even though this solution targets 
patents after they have been granted, it also has the benefit of changing the 
behavior of prospective patentees. 
In proposing to adjust patent strength, I must emphasize that I do not 
mean adjusting patent scope. Adjusting scope by, for instance, varying the 
amount of underlying matter the patent seeks to protect is not the aim of this 
proposal. Changing how much an issued patent’s claims cover is antithetical 
to efficiency because doing so would heighten uncertainty over the scope of a 
patent and would defeat the public-notice function of patent claims.10 In terms 
of what it means to vary patent strength, I proceed from the notion that the 
strength of a right ultimately lies in the right’s redressability. As Chief Justice 
Marshall said,  “[E]very right . . . must have a remedy, and every injury its 
proper redress.”11 So the strength of the patent right lies in how violations of 
that right are to be rectified (or not rectified, as the case may be). 
We traditionally conceive of the patent claim as static. That is, once the 
USPTO grants a patent, the strength of that right is invariant with time.12 
This is because the typical justification for the static nature of the patent right 
comes from the public-notice function of the patent claims.13 But public 
notice speaks to what may trigger infringement liability, which is a separate 
question from the strength of the patent right itself. This Comment does not 
propose to alter what conduct gives rise to infringement liability. Rather, it 
 
9 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 5, at 2165 (proposing that the best way to address issues within 
the patent system is to increase incentives to file better patents, decrease incentives to file bad 
patents, or do both). 
10 See United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942) (“[Patent claims] 
inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may 
be known which features may be safely used . . . and which may not.” (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Wabash Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938))). 
11 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803). 
12 See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that the USPTO’s broad 
interpretation of patent applications “serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that 
claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, The 
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102-03 (2005) (noting that a 
fundamental question in the current patent law is determining at which point in time a patent claim’s 
scope should be fixed). 
13 See supra note 10. 
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suggests that we should seek to modulate the law’s ability to redress any 
patent infringement depending on desired policy outcomes. Effectively, I am 
advocating for the government, in some circumstances, to encourage patent 
infringement by reducing the ease or degree of redressability for that 
infringement. This would also award the intentionally infringing party more 
negotiating power over the patent owner during pre-enforcement bargaining 
or settlement negotiations. 
This proposal is very much akin to encouraging efficient breaches of 
contracts by restricting specific performance remedies for breaches. Efficient 
breach stems from the idea that “if the promisor’s gain from breach, after 
payment of expectation damages, will exceed the promisee’s loss from 
breach,” the net gain in social utility from nonperformance is greater than if 
the contract was performed.14 Correspondingly, it is sometimes socially 
desirable to encourage patent infringement, and so the government should 
act to encourage it in instances where the benefits of infringement outweigh 
the costs of enforcement. But, of course, the devil is in the details. 
Scholars have discussed potential administrative reforms of the USPTO 
extensively, thus targeting the patenting process before a patent issues in the 
hope that the final granted patents are of higher quality.15 Legislators have 
also proposed litigation reforms and tweaks to procedural rules because they 
have identified vexatious litigation by patent trolls as a severe problem 
generating high social costs.16 These academic and legislative proposals do 
not, however, seek to create different classes of granted patents as I do here. 
Because there are many ways to vary the strength of the patent right, I do not 
make a specific policy proposal, which would be beyond the scope of this 
Comment. I instead make a normative claim that it is desirable and optimal 
to reform the patent system in such a manner. Embedding change as a part 
of the right itself, as I propose here, is neither antithetical to the concept of a 
right (as demonstrated by water law) nor alien to intellectual property rights 
(as demonstrated by the doctrine of incontestability in federal trademark 
law).17 And part of the appeal of this situation is that it exerts influence on all 
patents, not just on patent applications or litigated patents. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the modern 
realities of the patent system. There are many extrinsic and intrinsic pressures 
 
14 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, 
and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 997 (2005). 
15 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1017, 1035-39 (2004) (describing proposed reforms of the USPTO, such as increasing the 
amount of time spent examining patents and restructuring the patent examination process). 
16 See Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 281 (“At least fourteen patent reform bills were introduced in 
the . . . 113th Congress. Several of those bills focused specifically on patent litigation . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2012). 
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driving firms to prematurely seek patent protection, and this prematurity 
means that patents can be better conceptualized as prospects—i.e., 
opportunities to exploit or develop a technological opportunity. 
In Part II, I compare and contrast the law of prior appropriation of water 
with patent law and establish many critically important similarities (and 
differences) stemming from the conception of patents as prospects for 
innovation. Namely, water law has a requirement of beneficial use, requiring 
water appropriators to be continuously and productively using the water as a 
prerequisite for maintaining their right to use that water. Water law is useful 
as a point of comparison because although a water right is a usufructuary 
interest, the rationales underlying the law of appropriation are akin to those 
considerations underpinning patent rights. 
I proceed to argue in Part III that these important similarities between 
appropriative water law and patent law demonstrate that a strength-invariant 
patent right is economically inefficient for allocating scarce resources (in this 
case, a government-imposed scarcity). Rather, allowing for easier infringement 
of certain patents would allow for a more efficient allocation of inventive 
potential. I also defend the proposal on a philosophical basis. 
Finally in Part IV, I discuss examples of observable proxies for determining 
whether the patent is being used in an efficient and socially beneficial manner. 
Since a patent-by-patent analysis by the USPTO of whether a patent owner 
is usefully and productively harnessing the patent monopoly is costly and 
administratively infeasible, finding good proxies is a critical precondition to 
the implementation of any policy changes. This Comment, however, does not 
explore the exact ways in which patent strength can be altered. There are 
many ways that policymakers can tinker with the strength of the right. To 
decrease strength, patents can be given a weaker presumption of validity at 
trial; equitable relief (i.e., permanent injunctions) can be foreclosed; the 
amount of awardable damages can be decreased; and the pleading standards 
for patent infringement can be lowered. There are a number of ways that the 
patent right can be altered, and a case-by-case discussion of how each of these 
methods might work to achieve the desired policy outcomes is beyond the 
scope of this Comment and calls for additional research. 
Before I engage in further discussion, however, I want to clarify what costs 
this Comment seeks to address. The costs I discuss are broader than simply 
those inefficiencies or secondary markets that might unintentionally arise 
from the patenting system, such as patent trolls.18 I proceed from the 
 
18 See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 387, 423 (2014) (concluding that the costs from NPE lawsuits are “substantial, and . . . correspond to 
substantial social costs as well”); John F. Luman III & Christopher L. Dodson, No Longer a Myth, 
the Emergence of the Patent Troll: Stifling Innovation, Increasing Litigation, and Extorting Billions, 18 
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Schumpeterian premise that monopolistic conditions may be better at 
fostering innovation than an unrestrained free market.19 Indeed, American 
patent law is founded upon fostering innovation.20 Thus, patents, as weak-form 
monopolies, generate some sort of social cost as part of the bargain with 
inventors to encourage the public disclosure of innovation. But the costs of a 
patent are not only embodied by the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing, 
but also in the case of the marginal follow-on inventor: someone who would 
have innovated had it not been for a preexisting poor-quality patent or 
portfolio.21 I will show how my proposed changes, which act by varying the 
strength of the patent monopoly itself, address these concerns. 
I. PATENTS AS PROSPECTS 
There is near-universal agreement that patents influence innovation, but 
how patents do so is subject to considerable debate. Traditionally, a patent’s 
influence on innovation is rooted in the patent’s ability to allow the inventor 
to recoup initial investments in research and development. Professor Lemley 
calls this the ex ante justification for patenting “since, under this conception, 
the goal of intellectual property is to influence behavior that occurs before 
the right comes into being.”22 At first blush, the ex ante justification—the 
“rewards” theory of patenting—appears to provide both the strongest 
justification for, and most accurate description of, the current American 
patent system: we should only reward those inventors who come up with 
viable ideas and bring them to fruition. 
 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12, 13 (2006) (“Patent trolls therefore exploit the inefficiencies of the 
USPTO to target an increasing number of potential infringers.”); Damian Myers, Note, Reeling in 
the Patent Troll: Was eBay v. MercExchange Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 335-37 (2007) 
(adopting the normative premise that it is better to stem NPE activity); Andrea Peterson, Is 2015 
the Year Congress Finally Takes on Patent Trolls?, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/04/29/is-2015-the-year-congress-finally-takes-on-
patent-trolls/ [https://perma.cc/4V8J-U6CJ] (summarizing calls for patent reform to address the 
problem of patent trolls and considering whether congressional action is imminent). 
19 This is consonant with the highly influential view of innovation developed by Joseph 
Schumpeter, which holds that various kinds of monopolies, such as patents, could “produce not only 
steadier but also greater expansion of total output than could be secured by an entirely uncontrolled 
onward rush that cannot fail to be studded with catastrophes.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 91 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1994) (1943). 
20 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (“The Congress in the exercise of the 
patent power may not . . . enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement 
or social benefit gained thereby.”). 
21 See supra text accompanying note 8. See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8 
(describing the potential costs to innovation of patent portfolios). 
22 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129, 130 (2004). 
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Innovation, however, presents a classic common-pool problem because it 
is shared among many firms and actors. Without patents, no single firm can 
control innovation to any significant degree, and therefore multiple firms 
might expend resources to develop the same idea. This duplicative ex ante 
spending to develop an idea might exceed any social surplus created by the 
invention. In order to address this issue, Judge Posner noted that “[p]atents are 
granted before an invention has been carried to the point of commercial 
feasibility[, and this] heads off costly duplication of expensive development 
work.”23 Consequently, many scholars believe that rather than offering a 
purely ex ante incentive, patents additionally (or instead) offer some amount 
of ex post incentives. Far from being simply a reward for investments in 
innovation that have already taken place, a patent can be viewed as a 
“particular opportunity to develop a known technological possibility.”24 
The prospect theory of patents, made famous by Edmund Kitch in an 
article comparing patents to mining claims,25 is one such ex post justification 
for patenting because it is predicated on “incentives [that] the [patent] right 
gives its owner to manage works that have already been created.”26 Though 
the theory has been subject to both empirical and theoretical criticism,27 it 
has also been applauded by notable patent scholars.28 It remains an influential 
and compelling view of patents. And despite criticisms, what is near-certain 
is that many patents are granted before the subject matter contained within 
the patent is commercialized or usable: 
United States patent law, and in fact most national patent system law, has 
long encouraged inventors to file their patent applications shortly after the 
invention’s conception. . . . [P]atent law removes many of the potential 
barriers to early filing by having no actual reduction to practice 
requirement, a lax utility requirement, and the ability to file a provisional 
 
23 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.3, at 39 (7th ed., 2003). Judge 
Posner also articulates a point that will be discussed later in this Comment: “if [a patent is] granted 
too early—before the inventor actually knows how to make the product . . . a patent may actually 
retard innovation . . . .” Id. 
24 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977). 
25 See generally id. 
26 Lemley, supra note 22, at 130. 
27 See, e.g., Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: 
A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 203 (1980) (“[P]rospect features fail to assist market participants 
in their attempt to economize on the common property resource.”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (1990) (attacking the 
prospect theory because it promotes the idea that coordinated exploitation of ideas is more efficient 
than “rivalrous uncoordinated invention”). 
28 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 1045 (1997) (describing Kitch’s article as “one of the most significant efforts to integrate 
intellectual property with property rights theory”). 
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application. . . . Patent law pushes the inventor to file early to increase the 
likelihood of the patent’s validity.29 
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that patents, even provisional 
patents, attract equity financing from firms, particularly in early venture 
capital financing rounds.30 “[T]he process of patenting generates signals 
which help to overcome the liabilities of newness faced by new ventures.”31 It 
has become “conventional wisdom” that “the faster [the] filing [for patents] 
the better.”32 And nascent econometrics literature has also started to focus on 
the timing of the patent disclosure in the research and development process. 
For example, Professors Hopenhayn and Squintani have constructed a 
continuous-time race model that simulates the efforts of competing firms 
trying to patent an invention; the model seeks to better understand the 
impact of the timing of patent disclosures on social welfare.33 Thus, it seems 
that patents have become prospects whether we like it or not. 
How do we construct a fence around mere possibility—a prospect—especially 
when we cannot fully anticipate what the private or the public value of the 
patent will be, all while optimizing the chance to exploit opportunity without 
excessive deadweight loss? That is the question the patent system must seek 
to answer. The traditional notion of a static patent right, therefore, has little 
to no logical coherence in light of the theory of patents as prospects. 
Currently, patent rights are granted ex ante to the utilization (or lack thereof) 
and enforcement of the right. In patent law, these prospects are under an 
artificially imposed scarcity because the current conception of patent law 
makes it such that one particular opportunity is available to one person at a 
time: the patentholder. Only after expiration of the absolute patent right can 
others harness that opportunity. 
Prior appropriation water law sheds light on this issue. Like patents, it is 
a system of allocating property rights for a common resource that, if left 
unregulated and unchecked, can result in massive allocative inefficiencies. 
 
29 Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72 (2009). 
30 See Dietmar Harhoff, The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for 
Innovation (explaining that patents function as an informational tool to potential financiers and that 
the value of this information can be greater than the actual protections afforded by the patent), in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 55, 63 (David B. 
Audretsch et al. eds., 2011). It is worth noting, however, that empirical studies of the signaling quality 
of patents remain in their infancy. The papers cited in Professor Harhoff’s article suggest a 
correlation between patenting behaviors and financing. But to conclude that such a relationship is 
causal and free of endogeneities would be premature. 
31 Id. at 64. 
32 Bongsun Kim et al., The Impact of the Timing of Patents on Innovation Performance, 45 RES. 
POL’Y 914, 924 (2016). 
33 Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Francesco Squintani, Patent Rights and Innovation Disclosure, 83 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 199, 204-05 (2016). 
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And it illuminates the normative argument of this Comment: the strength of 
the patent right, once granted, should not be static. 
II.  PRIOR APPROPRIATION WATER LAW AND PATENTS 
The expansion and contraction of property rights has always been a part 
of the American legal tradition. We begin by looking at the flux in the 
strength of property rights at the nadir of American history: legalized 
slavery,34 the consequences of which were only partly addressed through a 
bloody Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction Amendments.35 Some of 
the friction over slavery was ignited by the young nation’s desire to achieve 
its “manifest destiny” to extend its grasp westward far beyond the Ohio River 
Valley36 while still maintaining the balance of free states and slaveholding 
states in the Senate.37 And despite the many factors complicating westward 
expansion, these issues mattered little to many of the individuals sprinting 
west in search of riches.38 As people moved west, there were additional strains 
on both the resources necessary to sustain the burgeoning population and the 
corresponding social institutions responsible for allocating resources in times 
of scarcity. One such resource was water. 
Riparian water rights, born in English common law and adopted by the 
eastern states, gave only those property owners adjacent to surface water 
usufructuary rights in that water.39 Other property owners who sought to 
improve the value of nonadjacent surrounding lands, such as by construction 
of irrigation channels, did not have any right or claim to the use of the water 
unless their property was directly abutting the surface water.40 But such a 
 
34 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-06 (1856) (upholding the practice of 
slavery under property rights). 
35 See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 702 (1976) 
(addressing the reputational harm the Supreme Court suffered as a consequence of the Dred Scott decision). 
36 See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976) (granting 
title to American citizens who settled and farmed western land); Act of Aug. 14, 1848, 9 Stat. 323 
(1848) (establishing the Oregon territory as “west of the summit of the Rocky Mountains”); Stephen 
Aron, Lessons in Conquest: Towards a Greater Western History, 63 PAC. HIST. REV. 125, 137-38 (1994) 
(describing expansion into the West); see also Patrick Austin Perry, Law West of the Pecos: The Growth 
of the Wise-Use Movement and the Challenge to Federal Public Land-Use Policy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
275, 280-86 (1996) (reviewing the legal history behind western expansion). 
37 See ROBERT PIERCE FORBES, THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS AFTERMATH: 
SLAVERY AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA 5, 8-9 (2007). 
38 See RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON & MARTIN RIDGE, WESTWARD EXPANSION: A HISTORY 
OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 232-34 (6th ed. 2001) (discussing the desire of many to move west 
despite poor conditions on the trip). 
39 Lucien Shaw, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Cal., The Development of the Law of 
Waters in the West, Address Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1922), in 10 CALIF. L. 
REV. 443, 447 (1922). 
40 Id. 
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system failed to effectively or efficiently allocate water in the drought-prone, 
arid West.41 The differences in climate between the thirteen colonies and the 
West meant that the English tradition was woefully inadequate in addressing 
the needs of the growing population and water-intensive gold mining, which 
required constructing works to divert rivers and streams from their natural 
course.42 If farmers irrigating crops far from the source of the water or gold 
miners diverting streams did not possess a right in the use of the water simply 
because they were not located adjacent to the water’s source, then that would 
effectively render fallow and unproductive all land not adjacent to surface 
water—which is a lot of land. 
In response, miners and homesteaders in the West drew upon the laws and 
traditions of Native Americans and previous Spanish colonizers to develop 
the law of appropriation,43 which seventeen western states adopted.44 Any 
water on public lands was subject to appropriation by someone who wanted 
to put the water to beneficial use.45 Rights would vest once actual work was 
completed to divert the water to where it was needed.46 Once vested, the 
appropriator would have the ability to perpetually use and consume the same 
quantity of water each year,47 and the beneficial uses of that water form the 
boundaries of the claimant’s usufructuary right.48 Critically, if the appropriator 
stopped putting the water to that beneficial use, then the appropriation right 
was lost under a “use it or lose it” principle.49 
 
41 See Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water 
Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 348 
(1989) (discussing the changes in water rights laws necessitated by the dry climate); see also Chennat 
Gopalakrishnan, The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation and Its Impact on Water Development: A Critical 
Survey, 32 AM. J. ECON. SOC. 61, 62 (1973) (“[I]f every drop of water which falls on the mountains 
of the West could be made available, there would not be enough to supply one-half of the land 
situated for irrigation.”). 
42 See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 41, at 347-48 (commenting that the similar climates of 
England and the eastern states allowed for similar water rights laws, but that no such similarity 
existed in the West). 
43 Id. at 349. 
44 See Frank J. Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 133, 133 (1955) 
(“In all of the 17 western states the constitutions or statutes adopt the law of prior appropriation for 
the regulation of rights to the use of water.”). 
45 See Shaw, supra note 39, at 451 (explaining that, for example, a diverter who used the water 
for a beneficial use established a vested right to use the water). 
46 Id. 
47 See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 459 (1931) (“To appropriate water means to take and 
divert a specified quantity thereof and put it to beneficial use in accordance with the laws of the 
state where such water is found, and, by so doing, to acquire under such laws, a vested right to take 
and divert from the same source, and to use and consume the same quantity of water annually 
forever, subject only to the right of prior appropriations.”). 
48 See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 41, at 350 (emphasizing the requirement that the use be 
beneficial). 
49 Id. 
1030 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1019 
The law of water appropriation exhibits three main characteristics: priority, 
diversion, and beneficial use.50 Two of these—priority and diversion—can be 
directly analogized to patent law. Beneficial use, however, lacks an analogue 
in the current patent law framework. This Comment focuses on the lack of a 
beneficial-use requirement in patent law as a source of vast economic inefficiency 
in the patent system that should be addressed by policy reforms. 
A. Priority 
The principle of “first in time, first in right,” otherwise known as priority, 
controls water appropriation.51 Those who are first to perfect a claim are 
senior in rights to all those who come after.52 Senior claimants’ uses have 
priority over all junior claimants’ uses; only after more senior claimants have 
satisfied their claim can a junior claimant then access the water.53 Challenges 
to priority are resolved in favor of the claimant who first began work on 
diverting the water for beneficial use. 
Analogously, patent law is also focused on priority. Before the passage of 
the AIA, American patent law featured a first-to-invent system whereby 
priority contests were resolved in favor of the inventor who first conceived of 
an invention and diligently reduced it to practice.54 Now, whoever first files 
the patent application is awarded the patent.55 Thus, a patent application filed 
later necessarily loses to an application filed earlier. Beyond a focus on priority, 
there are much deeper similarities between patent law and the law of water 
appropriation. Earlier patents affect later-filed patents or applications even if 
they do not contain the same invention.56 Because of this blocking function, 
earlier patents can change the incentives of subsequent follow-on innovators. 
This blocking function compares to the law of water appropriation, where 
junior claimants’ rights are affected by senior claimants’ rights.57 
For example, consider a mine owner who diverts eighty percent of the 
water flow of a river into a mine. Months later, a farmer might want to use 
the remaining water for irrigation, but even though there is some water left in 
 
50 Id. 
51 See People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1980). 
52 See Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878) (“The first appropriator was everywhere held 
to have, within certain well-defined limits, a better right than others to the claims taken up . . . .”). 
53 Johnson & DuMars, supra note 41, at 350. 
54 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (“In determining priority of invention under this subsection, 
there shall be considered . . . the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice . . . .”). 
55 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (rejecting a patent if a previously filed patent application 
described the invention). 
56 See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 8, at 62 (noting the burden on potential innovators 
to first acquire the related patents in their field). 
57 See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 41, at 350. 
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the river, the farmer might refrain from constructing the irrigation canals 
because there is not enough water left in that river to justify the cost. To 
directly analogize to the patent world, subsequent innovators might find that 
earlier patents or patent thickets crowd out any space to innovate in a given 
field, thus deterring innovation. That is not to say that there is no space left 
to innovate in the presence of a thicket. A creative inventor may find ways to 
patent around a patent thicket, but invention is well described as an iterative 
process whereby innovation builds on those that have come before it.58 
B. Diversion 
Another element of an appropriation claim is “some physical act with 
respect to the water by the appropriator to manifest the possessory right.”59 
Thus, a valid claim requires an effort or input on the part of the appropriator 
to harness the water to some beneficial use.60 
As applied to patents, the same logic is present in the principle of actual 
reduction to practice, which, as previously noted, was critical in resolving pre-AIA 
contests between inventors.61 Actual reduction to practice of an invention 
reflects the inventor’s exertion of effort to transform an idea into patentable 
form.62 Post-AIA, it matters little when something is actually reduced to 
practice because of the switch to a first-to-file system. But the American 
System is still concerned with the inventor’s exertion of effort in developing a 
patentable product or process that is novel and nonobvious as demonstrated 
by the requirements of Sections 102 and 103.63 There must be some kind of 
inventor input and effort because, as the Supreme Court recognized in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., “[g]ranting patent protection to advances that 
would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress 
and may . . . deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.”64 
 
58 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29-32 (1991) (discussing how technological progress is built upon 
earlier innovations). 
59 Fullerton v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 
see also In re Vought, 76 P.3d 906, 912 (Colo. 2003) (requiring “physical acts or other useful acts 
towards effectuating an appropriation” to underlie an appropriator’s claim to water); State ex rel. 
Martinez v. McDermett, 901 P.2d 745, 748 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing an appropriator to date 
back a water claim to “the beginning physical acts to take and use water”). 
60 Some states have removed this requirement statutorily by allowing in situ diversion of water 
to perfect the right, effectively eliminating the diversion requirement but keeping the beneficial-use 
requirement. See, e.g., State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263, 266-67 (Nev. 1988). 
61 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
62 See Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A]ctual reduction to practice 
requires demonstration that the embodiment relied upon as evidence of priority actually worked for 
its intended purpose.” (citing Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 588 (C.C.P.A. 1981))). 
63 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2012). 
64 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). 
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C. Beneficial Use 
Any desired diversion must put the water to a beneficial use, or else no 
right exists to appropriate the water.65 What constitutes beneficial use, however, 
is admittedly not clearly defined.66 But the beneficial-use requirement does 
important work in restricting the full scope of the prior appropriation rule. 
First, the requirement demands an appropriator’s continuous use of the water in 
order to maintain enjoyment of the right.67 Second, the use of the water must 
be for “productive purposes” only.68 And third, it allows judicial intervention for 
excessive uses of the water.69 
Patent law does not have a comparable requirement of beneficial use. Utility 
patents encompass broad categories of patentable subject matter: processes, 
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.70 But there are no 
requirements on what a patentee must do after her patent issues to retain full 
patent protection. Rather, all patents receive the full presumption of validity 
after they issue, regardless of whether the patentee chooses to use the patent.71 
To further elucidate the importance of this distinction between patent law 
and prior appropriation, we return to the example of the mine owner and the 
farmer wherein the mine owner uses eighty percent of the water from a river. 
As a result of the mine owner’s use of the water, the farmer chooses not to 
appropriate the remainder of the water because there is not enough left to 
cost-effectively divert for watering crops. Per the beneficial-use requirement, 
if the mine owner no longer utilizes the water for the mine (or uses less 
water), the right to divert eighty percent of the water diminishes to the degree 
that use is the lessened. And if the mine owner’s use ceases, then all rights 
dissipate. The farmer could now divert the river water to crops. Now, imagine 
that the river water is allocated under the patent regime and there is no 
requirement of beneficial use. The mine owner would retain the water right 
even if her use stopped. The farmer would still be blocked from appropriating 
 
65 See Shaw, supra note 39, at 451 (“The waters of these streams on the public lands of the 
United States were all subject to appropriation at any time by any person who proposed to devote 
the water so taken to a beneficial use.”). 
66 See Samuel C. Wiel, What is Beneficial Use of Water?, 3 CALIF. L. REV. 460, 461 (1915) (noting 
that many cases setting down the meaning of beneficial use focused on what beneficial use is not 
rather than what it is). 
67 A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:66 (2015). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
71 Id. § 282(a). Nonetheless, litigants can still challenge the validity of patents in litigation or 
via administrative procedures before the USPTO. See id. § 282(b) (allowing an alleged infringer to 
raise invalidity of the asserted patent as a defense in litigation); id. § 311(a) (providing that any 
nonowner of a patent can file a petition for inter partes review of the patent); id. § 321 (providing 
that any nonowner of a patent can file a petition for post-grant review). 
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the water even though there would be enough water available to use for 
watering crops. 
Herein lies the fundamental inefficiency of the patent system discussed 
in this Comment. Patents are a legal scarcity imposed on opportunities to 
exploit and improve on the status quo. This is comparable to granting 
usufructuary rights to beneficial users of water. But we grant the scarcity ex 
ante, before we know the uses of the patent. Thus, under the status quo, we 
allow for the possibility that the patent will remain unused and unexploited. 
Such a framework provides overbroad and overzealous protection of patent 
rights, which results in decreased incentives to develop follow-on products 
and inflated incentives for the patentholder.72 
III. THE BENEFITS OF MODULATING PATENT STRENGTH 
A. The Economic Rationale 
Patents, unlike water rights, are not perpetual because utility patent 
protection lasts only twenty years from the application date.73 Admittedly, 
this blunts the impact of the ineffective use or underutilization of patents 
because the problem resolves itself when the patents expire. However, 
inefficiencies still remain and thus modulating the patent right can lead to 
significant increases in efficiency. Angus Chu has attempted to measure the 
aggregate economic effect of blocking patents—specifically those that claim 
subject matter that follow-on innovators need permission (by licensing or 
paying a royalty) to use.74 Chu developed an econometrics model of blocking 
patents, drawing on macroeconomic parameter values developed previously 
in the empirical literature.75 He estimates that lessening the blocking effect 
of patents would result in a large increase in the share of GDP that research 
and development occupies, potentially even doubling its share as compared 
to the baseline.76 
Varying patent strength would not eliminate blocking patents altogether, but 
understanding the economic effects of blocking patents can help explain the 
benefits of allowing for certain kinds of weaker patents. Let us walk through 
two scenarios. 
 
72 See Scotchmer, supra note 58, at 32-34 (describing the disproportionate incentives that a 
system of broad patent protection creates). 
73 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (limiting utility patent protection to twenty years from the 
applicable date). 
74 See generally Angus C. Chu, Effects of Blocking Patents on R&D: A Quantitative DGE Analysis, 
14 J. ECON. GROWTH 55 (2009). 
75 Id. at 67-71. 
76 Id. at 70. 
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 Scenario A: A patent lies unused and unexploited by the patent owner. 
Its only function is to extract payments from subsequent innovators 
who need to use that first-generation patent. It serves a purely 
blocking function. Others who seek to use the patent, the follow-on 
inventors, cannot use it without permission. Note that this type of 
patent is what the beneficial-use requirement in prior appropriation 
water law seeks to prevent: waste of a scarce resource when the owner 
of that resource does not use it in a socially beneficial manner. 
 
 Scenario B: The same first-generation patent from Scenario A is used 
actively by the patent owner, who is approached by other innovators 
seeking to license the patent. The patent still serves a blocking 
function in the sense that others have to pay to use it. 
 
Under the status quo, the patent owner in either scenario has discretion to 
decide whether to license the patent. Furthermore, courts have the discretion 
to grant permanent injunctions against patent infringers, effectively serving 
as a deterrent to those who would seek to infringe without permission.77 
Admittedly, the standard for granting the injunction changed after eBay, Inc. 
v. MercExchange, LLC.78 Though no longer granted as a matter of due course 
in cases where infringement is found, permanent injunctions are still granted 
in the majority of cases that do not involve nonpracticing entities.79 Thus, the 
threat of a permanent injunction, on top of penalties for infringement,80 
serves as a strong deterrent for those who would intentionally infringe a patent. 
Nevertheless, it is better to decrease the patent owner’s bargaining power 
in Scenario A (i.e., the unexploited blocking patent) as opposed to Scenario B. 
This is because, in Scenario B, the owner is utilizing the patent and accruing 
social benefits; someone is exploiting the patent prospect. But in Scenario A, 
the patent will not have a positive social impact unless some other party can 
use the patent for follow-on innovation. The patent owner certainly is not 
exploiting the patent prospect. By serving as purely a blocking patent, the 
 
77 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
78 See id. (“[T]he decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable 
discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with 
traditional principles of equity . . . .”). 
79 See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical 
Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1966 (2016) (noting that “district courts appear to have adopted a de 
facto rule against injunctive relief for [nonpracticing entities]” but have awarded relief to the “vast 
majority” of other patentees). 
80 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant 
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty 
for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”). 
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patent in Scenario A only makes it more difficult and expensive for follow-on 
inventors to use it. 
The tables are stacked against follow-on inventors for intentional infringement 
of the patent because courts can grant equitable relief and damages in the 
event of infringement,81 and treble damages for intentional infringement.82 
But if we were to modulate the patent right in Scenario A—by weakening the 
right to reduce the asymmetric bargaining power between patent owner and 
follow-on inventor—we could give the follow-on inventor a chance to efficiently 
infringe the patent. Moreover, there are upstream benefits—before infringement 
or litigation take place—to changing the relative bargaining positions of a 
would-be infringer and the patent owner. Considering the more limited 
expected returns, the patentee in Scenario A may prefer to pursue licensing 
negotiations with a would-be infringer rather than risk the high costs of 
litigation. By lowering ex ante costs for follow-on inventors to exploit the 
patent, social utility is increased because the follow-on inventor’s exploitation 
of the patent creates a greater chance that inventive possibility—the artificially 
scarce resource captured by the patent—will inure to the public’s benefit.  
One important criticism that could be levied against this proposal is that 
there would be increased uncertainty inherent in the patent system, which in 
turn would increase transaction costs if the patentee negotiates with the 
follow-on inventor.83 But this is not a situation where there is asymmetric 
information about the patent, since neither party can really know or test the 
strength of the patent right without entering into costly and time-consuming 
litigation. The patentee does not have more information about the private 
value of the patent that can be exploited in negotiations. 
However, the problem of uncertainty can be remedied by setting bright-line 
rules instead of using sliding-scale approaches. Incontestability in trademark 
law is an example of a bright-line rule that changes the strength of the 
intellectual property right post-grant, allowing a trademark owner “to quiet 
title in the ownership of his mark” after five years of continuous use of the 
mark in commerce.84 Incontestability has the effect of preventing anyone 
from challenging a registered mark as merely descriptive.85 Though it does 
not have broader-ranging effects like precluding any validity challenge to a 
 
81 Id. 
82 Id.; see also Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that 
greater damages may be awarded in cases of willful infringement when there is a showing of objective 
recklessness). 
83 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979). 
84 Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1065 
(2012) (setting forth the requirements for incontestability of a trademark owner’s right to use a mark). 
85 See Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 196 (“The language of the Lanham Act also refutes any conclusion 
that an incontestable mark may be challenged as merely descriptive.”). 
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registered mark,86 incontestability is nonetheless a useful tool that rewards those 
who have continuously used the mark by foreclosing an avenue of attack, thus 
reducing potential litigation costs and improving the bargaining position of 
the mark holder. 
Using sliding-scale or holistic approaches does not mean that attendant 
increases in transaction costs would necessarily outweigh the increased social 
utility of having more parties tap into the patent prospect. We have to be 
clear on the type of uncertainty discussed here. Uncertainty can lead to 
amplified misperception by the parties as to their own side’s merits, and 
relatedly, the likelihood that any litigation will be resolved in their favor. But, 
as stated above, changing the strength of the patent right does not mean it 
will be easier or more difficult to infringe a patent. It only changes how parties 
choose to remedy or negotiate infringement, if at all. Therefore, neither party 
is any more likely to be more certain about the initial question of whether the 
patent was infringed. Making it easier to infringe patents by reducing 
punishments for infringement should actually make it more obvious that 
people have infringed or would want to infringe. Rather, uncertainty enters 
the equation here only as it relates to the remedies that can be awarded in a 
lawsuit, which informs the parties’ positions in any prelitigation negotiations. 
Nevertheless, this kind of uncertainty is already inherent in the status quo. 
Damages calculations are already unpredictable because “[t]he methodology 
encompasses fantasy and flexibility.”87 Modulating patent strength would not 
so exacerbate the uncertainty already inherent in the system as to make it 
unworkable, but policymakers should be sensitive to anything that would 
render damages calculations even more opaque than they already are. 
B. The Philosophical Rationale 
Blackstone viewed property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion 
of the right of any other individual in the universe.”88 Blackstone’s ideas 
“helped inspire the Declaration of Independence, influenced the deliberations 
of the Constitutional Convention, articulated a sense of providence like the 
one that touched Abraham Lincoln, and instructed the children, grandchildren, 
great grandchildren and great-great grandchildren of his initial American 
 
86 See Singh v. V. Patel & Sons, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 318, 320 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“[I]ncontestability 
simply obviates any need for [the plaintiff] to prove the existence of secondary meaning for its mark 
to seek enforcement against a claimed infringer . . . .”). 
87 Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988), overruled by 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
88 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
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readers on the virtues of the English common law.”89 But rooted in his notion 
of a property right is the idea that we seek to encourage property holding 
because it is the root of economic well-being; it is not the natural-rights idea 
that property should be respected for its own sake as an intrinsic good.90 
Blackstone writes that our ancestors, if provided merely a usufructuary 
right of property, would not seek to improve upon it in a way that would make 
life “more easy, commodious, and agreeable; as, habitations for shelter and 
safety, and raiment for warmth and decency.”91 But as mankind developed, the 
right evolved and ossified to enable the efficient distribution of land to create 
permanent agrarian communities and shift away from hunter-gatherer 
societies.92 Blackstone concludes that the “permanent right of property . . . was 
no natural, but merely a civil, right.”93 Nonetheless, it seems inimical to the 
very core of the right to be able to adulterate it or meddle with it after its 
grant, even if doing so does not violate some fundamental natural order. 
Blackstone’s rationale for the existence of the property right rested in its 
constancy and predictability, which led to allocative efficiency improvements 
that augment overall social welfare.94 
Patents are a sort of weak-form “sole and despotic dominion”95 over an 
idea for a given period of time. And patent owners have as much of a right to 
squander their patent prospects as farmers do to leave their farmland barren 
and unsown. It just so happens that farmers can freely squander their land 
until the metaphorical cows come home, whereas patentees are limited by the 
twenty-year term of the patent. Here, we purposefully tamper with constancy 
and predictability—part of the core of what it means to truly possess a right. 
So it does not feel entirely satisfactory to justify varying patent strength by 
pointing to the fact that patent rights are already restrained and time-limited. 
Such logic seems to rely on the somewhat superficial notion that tangible 
property is of a different ilk than intellectual property, and thus it is 
acceptable to subject intellectual property to different rules. The Constitution 
fuels this notion of the unique status of intellectual property with the 
Intellectual Property Clause, which grants Congress the power to “secur[e] 
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries” 
 
89 Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
90 See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1905 (2007) 
(examining moral justifications for property rights). 
91 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at *4. 
92 See id. at *7 (stating that agriculture “introduced and established the idea of a more permanent 
property in the soil”). 
93 Id. at *11. 
94 See id. at *4 (“But when mankind increased in number, craft, and ambition, it became 
necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion . . . .”). 
95 Id. at *2. 
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in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”96 Nowhere else 
is the Constitution so explicit about the utilitarian underpinnings of property 
law than in the Intellectual Property Clause. 
Nevertheless, while it might seem wrong or feel unfair to pull the rug out 
from under the patentee if the patentee squanders the patent right, doing so 
is not in tension with the American understanding of property or intellectual 
property rights as utility-maximizing regimes. Both intellectual property and 
tangible property rights exist for the betterment of the public good. Neither 
is an unqualified or unlimited right. And as illustrated by the discussion of 
prior appropriation water rights, the notion that the strength or scope of 
property rights can change without one’s consent, owing to mechanisms outside 
of one’s control, is not offensive to the American tradition either; appropriators 
must continuously use water for a beneficial purpose, or they lose it.97 
IV. PROXIES FOR THE BENEFICIAL USE OF PATENTS 
In this Part, I delineate two observable indicators of whether a patent 
owner is exploiting the patent prospect in a beneficial manner. Since it is 
infeasible because of astronomical administrative costs to examine each and 
every patent to determine whether it is being exploited in a societally beneficial 
manner, we must find easily measurable alternatives to doing so. The ultimate 
goal is to find good proxies for whether the patent owner is putting the patent 
to a beneficial use.  
One indicator of productive exploitation is determining if the patent 
owner is engaging in bona fide commercial use of the patent. This makes 
intuitive sense. Use in commerce is indicative of value that can be captured 
by consumers. The second indicator is a fee payment system where patent 
owners pay to keep their patents at full strength. If the fee is not paid, then 
the patent strength decreases. Admittedly, this indicator is not as robust as 
the first; the owners of patents used purely to extract royalty or licensing 
payments from follow-on inventors could still pay the fee and keep their 
patents at full strength. 
A. Bona Fide Commercial Use 
Patent law could reward patented inventions used in commerce with stronger 
protection than those which are not. Trademark law already has a similar 
requirement.98 And such a requirement would be very similar in substance to 
the beneficial-use requirement in water appropriation law, which necessitates 
 
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
97 See supra Part II. 
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (requiring a trademark have some “bona fide” use in commerce). 
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continuous use of appropriated water in order for the appropriator to preserve 
his or her rights.99 If a patent remains unused, the government should 
encourage the redistribution of the scarce resource—the patent prospect—to 
those who would actually seek to harness it. 
Sometimes it is obvious that a patent is being used in commerce, as when 
all the steps of a method patent are performed or when a patented invention 
is marketed or sold to consumers. It would make sense to include within the 
definition of bona fide commercial use all the behaviors that give rise to 
patent infringement: making, using, offering to sell, or selling patented 
inventions in the United States or importing patented inventions into the 
United States.100 Including these behaviors in the definition of commercial 
use would mean that the patentee could undertake to use the patent in all the 
ways that an infringer could infringe on a patent. 
But what of licensed patents? Does it make sense to include a licensed 
patent within the definition of “used in commerce”? I believe that the answer 
is no; licensed uses should not count as commercial uses. Licenses vary in 
degree of exclusivity, and there are relatively few limitations on how to 
structure a patent license because they are contractual relationships governed 
mostly by state law.101 But licenses tell us very little about whether the patent 
is used by the patent owner in a beneficial manner. They might be indicators 
of whether entities other than the patent owner are exploiting the patent 
right. But nonetheless, the patent right still belongs to the patent owner even 
if the patent is licensed out, and the owner has full discretion to contractually 
prohibit certain ways in which the patent prospect can be exploited. For 
instance, field-of-use restrictions can be placed on a licensee’s use of a patent, 
“rigorously limiting the scope of the license in order to narrow it to only the 
field intended.”102 Take the example of a patented chemical compound 
originally used as a lubricant for agricultural or farming purposes. The patent 
owner might use a field-of-use restriction to bind subsequent follow-on 
inventors from exploring potential uses of the compound to treat baldness,103 
thus effectively precluding anyone else from exploiting the patent prospect 
in other productive ways. So if we count patent licenses as uses in commerce, 
patent owners can readily exploit this by granting extremely restrictive 
 
99 See supra Part II. 
100 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (delineating the actions that can give rise to a claim of patent 
infringement). 
101 But see Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2407-08 (2015) (upholding a blanket 
prohibition on patent licenses for payment of royalties past the expiration of the patent term). 
102 2 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 15.12 (2011). 
103 This hypothetical is based on a real case. Bag Balm, a chemical lubricant used on cow udders, 
was a patented compound. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). But then a follow-on 
inventor applied for a method patent proposing to use Bag Balm as a treatment for baldness. Id. 
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licenses to demonstrate commercial use. With a stronger patent right in hand, 
the patent owner now would have a stronger bargaining position against all 
other follow-on inventors. Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the 
number of patents licensed for royalties is not actually that large.104 So the 
impact of excluding licensing from the definition of bona fide commercial use 
may not have much of an impact on the market as a whole. 
Another potentially confounding consideration is that since patent rights 
are granted relatively early in the inventive process, before commercial 
exploitation might even be feasible,105 patent owners may not be ready to use 
their patent in commerce when it is first granted. If patentees cannot 
immediately use the patent in commerce, they will be concerned about other 
parties being able to cheaply and easily obtain access to the protected subject 
matter of the patent. This in turn would likely shift patenting to later in the 
inventive process and that would likely make patents much more of a reward 
for prior investments than a prospect for future development. It would be a 
clear statement by policymakers that they prefer the reward theory to the 
prospect theory of patents. 
If something is to be done about this concern, however, then perhaps we 
should account for the patentee’s intent to use the patent in commerce. 
Although trademarks must be used in commerce in order to be valid,106 federal 
trademark law provides that applicants can file an intent-to-use application 
for a trademark; a successful applicant must show actual use within six months 
of the trademark grant.107 There could be a similar mechanism in patent law 
wherein an intent to use the patent in commerce, registered with the USPTO, 
would be sufficient to provide the patentee the protections of actual use in 
commerce so long as the patentee takes reasonable steps to prepare the patent 
prospect for commercial exploitation. 
B. Annual Patent Fees 
There has been some interest in the economics literature for weeding out 
poor-quality and low-private-value patents by instituting higher patent 
maintenance fees108 because payment of maintenance fees can be “indicative of 
 
104 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1503-06 (positing that the number of licensed patents is not 
large because patents are concentrated in areas in which royalty-licensing agreements are uncommon, 
patentees who would want to license their patents for royalties have a small portion of the patents, 
and many inventions are patented that will never be used or be subject to a licensing agreement). 
105 See supra text accompanying note 29. 
106 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
107 Id. §§ 1051(b)(1), (d)(1). 
108 See generally Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 
30 RAND J. ECON. 197 (1999) (describing the effect of patents on R&D efforts and demonstrating 
that differentiating patent lives when firms have different R&D productivities can improve social 
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the long term value of the patent.”109 Maintenance fees must be paid at three 
points in time: three-and-a-half years, seven-and-a-half years, and then 
eleven-and-a-half years after issuance of the patent.110 The thinking is that 
patent owners who do not believe that their patents are worth much in the 
long run would not pay the fee because the private value of their patent is 
worth less than the fee itself. But to try and test whether a patent owner is 
engaging in beneficial uses of the patent, the government could mandate that 
some kind of registration fee be paid each year, on top of the maintenance 
fees. If the fee is not paid then the patent would not lapse, but the patent 
strength would decrease. 
Though payment of fees might tell us something about the private value 
of patents, this is not a good proxy because it fails to differentiate between 
patent owners who are actually exploiting the prospect from those who are 
using the patent purely to extract money from follow-on inventors. The 
private value of patents can be increased by societally unproductive behaviors 
too. Trying to differentiate amongst productive and unproductive patent 
owners in this way would be relatively hopeless. 
CONCLUSION 
Modulating patent strength may address many of the inefficiency problems 
endemic in patent law. Blocking patents present a special concern since they 
permit a patent owner to take advantage of the patent monopoly without 
actually exploiting the patented invention for the betterment of society. By 
adjusting patent strength to weaken patents solely used by their owners to 
extract licensing revenues or royalties from follow-on inventors, society could 
tailor patent law to better fit its original Schumpeterian objectives of granting 
a limited monopoly to achieve greater social welfare outcomes. 
A beneficial-use requirement for patents would have an impact on 
stemming the inefficiencies from blocking patents, though it certainly would 
not completely resolve the issue. As discussed above, there are viable ways to 
easily observe and measure whether patent owners are putting their patents 
 
welfare); Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The Role of Fees in Patent 
Systems: Theory and Evidence, 27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 696 (2013) (discussing how patent fees could be 
used as a policy tool); Jean O. Lanjouw et al., How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The 
Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405 (1998) (discussing patent counts 
as measures of innovation); Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 
RAND J. ECON. 181 (1999) (looking particularly at the economics of patent renewal systems). 
109 Moore, supra note 6, at 1550. 
110 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2015). But this is not a hard-and-fast rule. If the failure to pay the 
fee was unintentional or unavoidable, and a petition was filed and the fee was paid within a year and 
a half after the deadline (including a six-month grace period for fee payment after the deadline), 
then the patent can be reinstated. Id. § 1.378. 
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to a beneficial use. One such proxy is a requirement of bona fide use of the 
patent in commerce in order for the patent to receive full legal protection. 
Another is requiring additional fees to keep patents at full strength. 
Further study is needed to weigh the pros and cons of the various policy 
levers that can be pulled to maximize the benefits of “efficient” patent 
infringement while minimizing any destabilizing effects that weakening the 
patent right may have. Nonetheless, this Comment has proposed a new way 
of thinking about patent infringement. Infringement does not have to be cast 
in a purely negative light as trampling on property rights. Rather, we can 
harness infringement as a tool to appropriately tailor the strength of the 
patent right to better match the value of a patent. 
